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This thesis analyzes the Naval Reserve budget during the
period FYs 1970-1987 and compares the Naval Reserve budget
growth to the active Navy budget growth during the same
period. By performing descriptive data analysis on the
total budget authority of both the active and reserve Navy
during the period under study, the data indicates that the
Naval Reserve has received its fair share of the active Navy
budget during the majority of the years of the study. The
Naval Reserve's share of the active Navy budget is justified
due to the tremendous growth of personnel and missions in
the Naval Reserve during the period. The growth of the
Naval Reserve budget appears to have been effected more by
the defense buildup of the Reagan administration than by the
formulation of the Total Force concept in 1970 for the Guard
and Reserves. The yearly changes of the Naval Reserve
budget are primarily incremental, which indicates the Naval
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The unprecedented high levels of the Federal deficit
continue to increase the close scrutiny of the Federal
budget. The Reagan administration's policies of massive
increases in defense spending have begun to encounter
growing opposition from both the public and Congress. Due
to the well-publicized increases in spending levels for the
Department of Defense (DOD), Congress is pressuring DOD for
reductions in the defense budget to help reduce the federal
budget deficit. The numerous programs within the DOD must
now concentrate on competing for these scarce defense
dollars .
There is nothing new about the intense competition of
programs within the Federal and the DOD budgets. There have
been many studies done on the competition of programs in the
Congressional budgetary process [Refs. 1 -12]. These
studies attempt to explain how Congress allocates dollars to
different government agencies. The constraints of the
monies available for defense require the United States to
maximize the use of military personnel resources, both
active and reserve. As a result, the active and reserve
components of the military services must now compete for
these scarce defense dollars [Ref. 21.
Over the years, the Naval Reserve has seen their
responsibilities increase to the point where they now
account for 100% of the U.S. Navy's forces in some mission
areas. This study attempts to determine if the increased
responsibilities of the Naval Reserve has been reflected in
their competition for funds with the active Navy in the
budgetary process.
B. SCOPE
This thesis uses descriptive data analysis to focus on
the changes in the Naval Reserve budget and to what degree
they have kept pace with the changes in the active Navy
budget during the period fiscal years (FYs) 1970 - 1987.
The analysis will concentrate on the total budget authority
for the active and reserve Navy.
C, RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary question to be answered in this thesis is
whether or not the Naval Reserve has maintained a "fair
share" of the active Navy budget base during the period FYs
1970 - 1987. The difference between the terms "fair share"
and the "base" is as follows: The base is the expectation
among the agencies involved that their programs will be
continued at close to their present level of expenditure;
the term "fair share" not only means the base an agency has
established but also the expectation that the agency will
receive some portion of funds, if any, which are to be
increased over or decreased below the base of another
agency. This "fair share" then becomes an expectation of
how much the agency expects to receive as compared to other
agencies. [Ref. 12, p. 17]
The secondary question of this thesis is what impact, if
any, has the Total Force concept had on the Navy Reserve
budget. A subsidiary question is whether or not the changes
in the Naval Reserve budget have appeared to be incremental
or programmatic in nature. The definitions of the




The source of data used for analyzing the questions
proposed in this thesis are historical budgetary data
obtained from The Budget of the United States [Ref. 13].
Total budget authority for both the active and reserve Navy
are examined on a yearly basis.
The primary question of "fair share" for the Naval
Reserve is analyzed by the following two methods:
1. By presenting how the Naval Reserve budget, as a
percentage of the active Navy budget, has changed
during this period. If the Naval Reserve's percentage
of the active Navy budget remained the same or
Increased from the previous year, then the Naval
Reserve received its "fair share" for that particular
year .
2. By comparing the percent change from the previous year
of both the active and reserve Navy budgets. If the
change in the Naval Reserve budget was equal to or
better than the change in the active Navy budget, then
the Naval Reserve achieved their "fair share" of the
active Navy budget for that particular year.
The secondary question of whether or not the Naval
Reserve budget has been impacted by the Total Force concept
is answered by analyzing the growth of the Naval Reserve
Budget during the period FYs 1970-1987. The background of
the Total Force concept will be discussed in Chapter II.
The subsidiary question of whether or not changes in the
Naval Reserve budget have appeared to be incremental or
programmatic is answered by analyzing the percent change in
the Naval Reserve budget each year of the study. Using the
same criteria as the Fenno study [Ref. 3], the changes in
the Naval Reserve budget will be considered incremental if
the change is 10% or less per year. Any changes larger than
10% will be considered programmatic.
E. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II provides background information on budgeting
literature, Naval Reserve history, and the Total Force
concept. Chapter III defines the study and presents the
data base and results. Chapter IV concludes the thesis with





Budgeting literature concerning the budgetary change of
agencies can be divided into two groups: incremental and
programmatic ( non- incremental ) [Ref. 11, p. 859]. The
incremental ist theory is that an agency's budget is very
rarely reviewed as a whole each year in the sense that each
agency's programs are reviewed and compared to possible
alternatives. Instead, the agency's budget is based on its
budget of the previous year with relatively small plus or
minus increments to the existing base [Ref. 12, p. 15].
The second theory of programmatic or non-incremental theory
states that factors other than the previous year's budget
base of an agency play a significant part in the budgetary
process
.
There have been numerous studies done on the incremental
theory of budgeting [Refs. 1, 2, 3]. One of the most
notable studies of incrementalism was done by Davis,
Dempster and Wildavsky [Ref. 1]. Davis et al. in this study
proposed that:
There are striking regularities in the budgetary process.
The evidence from over half of the non-defense agencies
indicates that the behavior of the budgetary process of
the United States government results in aggregate
decisions similar to those produced by a set of simple
decision rules that are linear and temporally stable.
[Ref. 1, p. 5291
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Their theory suggests that Congress is unwilling to make
the difficult budgetary decisions. Congress would rather
rely on the agency's last budget and make only incremental
"relatively fixed" budget requests of the agency. The term
"relatively fixed" is used because they propose that
Congress may change the percentage given to an agency due to
special circumstances and events for a given year.
Another study by Wanat [Ref. 2] expands on the
incremental theory proposed by Davis, et al. [Ref. 1]. His
study was based on the Department of Labor's appropriations
bills from FYs 1968-1972. He proposes that to use
incrementalism as an explanatory tool, incrementalism must
specify not only that a small change was made to the status
quo but also must specify why the change was so small [Ref.
2, p. 1221]. Wanat's study concludes that further research
should be given to the programmatic portion of the budget
since this is the area where politics might enter into the
budgetary process [Ref. 2, p. 1228].
A study by Fenno focused on the appropriations process
used in Congress [Ref. 3]. The Congressional Committee
members developed stable working relations with agencies
over time. Viewing the annual changes in an agency's
appropriation, Fenno concluded that the majority of
Congressional Committee decisions are incremental. Fenno's
study is interesting since he used the percent change of
agencies appropriation to determine if the change was
12
Incremental. His analysis revealed that the majority of the
committee's decisions (53%) resulted in no more than a 10%
change over the agency's previous appropriation. Using 20%
change as a cut-off point, three-quarters of the committee's
decisions were Included. [Ref. 3. pp. 352-355]
A more recent study by Pitavada and Draper proposes that
although the incremental theory has many critics, they still
believe that incremental ism is the most effective way to
understand the budgetary process [Ref. 41. They believe
that the following five factors have increased the tendency
toward incrementalism to explain the federal budgeting
process
.
1 . Indexing and Inflation
Eight major federal entitlement programs are indexed
to the rate of inflation. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is
normally used for this index. These entitlement budgets
will be incremental because indexing is a steady adjustment
along a predetermined path dictated by the CPI. Another
method for dealing with inflation is called "cost growth"
which is primarily used by DOD . Since FY 1978 DOD has been
allowed bylaw (Public Law 94-361) to request additional
budget authority in the defense budget to cover price
increases caused by inflation for defense related products.
These inflationary increases for defense items purchased
13





President Jimmy Carter, in his FY 1980 budget
message, announced a new three-year budget planning system.
This change was designed to help agencies plan and organize
on a long-term basis. Since the agencies had to display
three-year costs, their focus would be on the incremental
change required above the prior base year.
The longest multiyear budgeting process has been
done by DOD. Since Robert McNamara introduced the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) into DOD in 1961,
DOD has used the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) to plan their
budget. The FYDP is actually a seven year display of
budgetary resources (current year, budget year, and five
outyears). The FYDP has become a base where the next budget
cycle can begin; therefore, the outyears are just extensions
of the past years. Although many decisions made in DOD will
result in large changes in future DOD budgets, the process
is considered incremental since changes are applied to bases




Continuing resolutions are the authority Congress
gives to government agencies to continue obligating funds
when Congress has failed to pass the annual appropriations
act. Since 1980 the Congress has had a terrible record for
14
passing appropriations acts by the required date of
October 1. The biggest reason for this difficulty has been
the budget cuts proposed by the Reagan administration.
Congress has used the process of using continuing
resolutions to avoid making the tough budget reduction
dec is ions
.
These continuing resolutions are truly incremental
in nature since they allow the agencies to be funded based
on adjustments to prior years' budgets or budget requests.
Since it does not appear that budgetary conflict will lessen
in the future, Congress will most likely continue to use the
continuing resolution technique to make incremental changes
in the federal budget. [Ref. 4, pp. 403-404]
4 . Baseline Reviews
According to Section 605(a) of the Budget and
Impoundment Act of 1974, the President is required to submit
a "current services" budget to Congress each year on or
before November 10. In practice, this current services
budget, which displays budget authority and outlays for the
fiscal year, is submitted along with the President's budget
the following January. Congress has come to rely on this
current services budget as a "base" for ongoing agency
programs. Congress and the administration both use these
baselines for a departure point for future budgetary
decisions. These budgetary baselines can be used to help
the agencies protect their current programs against possible
cuts by Congress or Administration. Baselines tend to be
respected by most participants in the budgetary process;




Incremental ( Decremental ) Budget Displays
Governmental agencies, including DOD, display their
budget requests to Congress in an incremental manner. An
agency's budget request to Congress tends to focus on a
three-year period: past, current, and budget request year.
Each agency submits to Congress, along with the President's
budget, their "justification books." These books provide
Congress a more detailed description of the changes to an
agency's programs. Although the "justification books"
submitted display the total budget requests of the agency,
the books are really a display of incremental change for the
agency. [Ref. 4, pp. 402-405]
While the incremental theory of budgeting has been the
dominant theory in budgeting since the 1960s, there are a
growing number of critics of the incremental theory of
budgeting. These critics believe that there are many
variables other than the "base" that must be considered in
the budgetary process [Ref. 5, p. 61]. There have been
numerous studies which support the non- incremental ist views
[Refs. 6, 7, 8 ] .
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One of the classic studies to question the incremental
theory is by Natchez and Bupp [Ref. 6]. They do not
challenge the fact that what occurs in future budgets has a
relationship to past budgets, since agency budgets are not
written from scratch each year. But what they do suggest is
that there is a large amount of public policy which is
embedded in the budgetary powers [Ref. 6. p. 952]. They
suggested an alternative approach to the analysis of
budgetary data that would reveal public policy and
priorities in the budgetary process. They analyzed 23
Atomic Energy Commission programs during the period FYs
1959 - 1972 and transformed the budgetary data of the
programs into an "index of prosperity" which would indicate
the success or failure of the programs to compete for scarce
dollars [Ref. 6, p. 958], They found that embedded in the
total budget of an agency there was indeed a great deal of
variation caused by political events. They found that
programs within an agency prosper because the directors of
these programs had successfully built the political support
to withstand budget cuts from competing sources. [Ref. 6,
p . 9 6 3]
William Moreland conducted a study within the Department
of Agriculture over the period FYs 1946 - 1971 and concluded
that the incremental ist approach did not adequately explain
the budget outcome of the department [Ref. 7]. Moreland
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found that factors other than previous appropriations were
important in explaining the overall outcome of the budgets.
These factors included agency size, agency managerial
capacity, and the administrative experience of
administrators and staff within the agency [Ref. 7, p. 45].
His findings suggest that the final appropriation for an
agency incorporates these factors and not just the
incremental ist view of addition to or subtraction from a
base .
Another analysis of budget theory by Bozeman, Barry and
Straussman proposes that the budgetary processes of the
future are likely to be influenced by a number of factors
which challenge the theory of incrementalism [Ref. 8]. They
suggest that incrementalism may prevail when budgets are
increasing, but the incremental theory does not work well
when the budget has to be reduced. Their analysis of the
FYs 1982 - 1983 federal budgets shows that the "base" of an
agency is no longer a sacred cow. The Reagan administration
has shown that not only will they cut the base of a program,
but they will also go after entitlement program cuts which
were previously thought to be uncontrollable. Due to the
large federal deficit of the 1980s, budgetary restraint will
be with us for years to come; and as a result of this fiscal
austerity, the role of incrementalism will decline. Bozeman
et al. propose that during periods of budgetary growth the
appropriations increases requested by agencies will be
incremental in nature. This is true since the agencies can
usually negotiate an incremental increase with Congress.
But Congress does not perform well at administering cuts in
an incremental way. The inability of Congress to address
budget cuts in a responsible manner will place even more
emphasis on the President and the executive branch to enact
the budget cuts. When the budget reductions are initiated
from the executive branch, the agencies are less likely to
be guaranteed their "fair share" of the budget. [Ref. 8,
pp. 509-515]
There are many who believe that the budgetary program is
composed of both incremental and programmatic theory [Refs.
9, 10, 11]. Bromiley and Crecine conducted a study using
budgetary data from fifteen major government agencies from
1953 to 1966. They suggest that while there is an
incremental decrease or increase in the total budget, there
is an underlying mechanism of change occurring within the
budget. Most yearly adjustments to agency budgets can be
explained but some cannot. They suggest that the President
cannot be overly occupied with the minute details of all
agency allocations within the federal government. Instead,
the President is very likely to have a keen interest in one
or two agencies. They call these agencies "pres ident ially
salient". As a result, these pet projects of the President
will be treated differently in the budgetary process. These
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agencies can vary from president to president. (e.g., NASA
under President Kennedy and DOD under President Reagan.)
[Ref.9, p. 1053]
Arnold Kanter, in his study of the National Defense
budget during FYs 1960 - 1970, suggests that Congress has
both a fiscal and a programmatic policy toward defense
spending [Ref. 10]. He studied the five largest
appropriation titles within DOD: Personnel, Operations and
Maintenance (O&M), Procurement, and Research and
Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E). Concerning
these four major appropriations, Congress has tended to be
incremental in dealing with the Personnel and O&M accounts
and programmatic in dealing with the Procurement and RDT&E
accounts. Considering the size and complexity of the
defense budget, it is not surprising that Congress has
focused most of its energy on Procurement and RDT&E. [Ref.
10, p. 129]
Personnel and O&M are relatively stable, whereas
Procurement and RDT&E contain the largest amount of proposed
changes from year to year. The data compiled by Kanter
reinforces the belief that Congress uses Procurement and
RDT&E funding to influence national security policy. He
suggests that the widely held notion that Congress only
makes incremental, non-critical changes to the President's
Defense Budget does not do justice to Congress. The
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Congressional budgetary process contains both
budgetary/incremental and programmatic behavior occurring
simultaneously. [Ref. 10, p. 142]
John Gist conducted a study of DOD appropriations for
RDT&E from FYs 1963 - 1977 and found that there was evidence
of both incremental and programmatic behavior in the
budgetary process [Ref. 11]. Using the same data, he
demonstrated how the incremental ist view of Davis, et al.,
[Ref. 1] and the programmatic views of Natchez, et al.,
[Ref. 6] could be justified. He suggests that since both
theories are consistent with the same set of data, they
cannot be regarded as competing theories but as
complimenting each other when dealing with resource
allocation in the budgetary process. Future research into
the political process of budget allocation should focus on
integrating the incremental and programmatic theories rather
than pitting them against each other. It is interesting to
note that Gist proposed that a more useful approach to
identifying shifting budget priorities would be a "share of
the increment" approach. His alternative method of
analyzing budgetary change would involve investigating the
agency's or program's share of the increment relative to its
existing share of the total budget. [Ref. 11, pp. 862-871]
B. NAVAL RESERVE HISTORY, MISSION, AND STRUCTURE
1
. History
The concept of a reserve militia to serve the nation
goes back to the colonial days. The Navy Department, in
1887, prepared a plan of organization for a naval militia
force. By 1894, the militia movement had progressed to the
point where the Secretary of the Navy was given authority to
lend each state having a naval militia one of the Navy's
older ships. [Ref. 14]
By 1897, sixteen states had a naval militia in one
form or another. When Theodore Roosevelt took over as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the United States Naval
Militia had over four thousand officers and enlisted men.
[Ref. 14]
During the First World War, approximately 30,000
reserve officers and 300,000 enlisted reservists served on
active duty. After the war, the states' naval militia were
dissolved, and the future of the reserves was in doubt.
Finally, in 1925, legislation established the air reserve
and generally revitalized the Naval Reserve organization.
By 1938 there were 11,000 officers and 13,000 enlisted
personnel in the Naval Reserves. [Ref. 14]
The outbreak of World War II saw the largest buildup
of the Navy in history. The Navy grew to three million men
and women during this period. Of the 320,000 officers on
22
duty in 1945, all but approximately 13,000 were Reservists.
In the years that followed World War II, the Naval
Reservists have continued to serve with distinction in
periods of national crisis. [Ref. 15, pp. 15-16]
Today's Naval Reserve had its genesis in 1946 with
the establishment of the Naval Air Reserve Training Command
(headquartered in Glenview, Illinois) and the Naval Surface
Reserve Training Command (headquartered in Omaha, Nebraska).
These two commands were combined in New Orleans, Louisiana,




The mission of the Navy Reserve is to provide
trained units and qualified individuals for active duty in
time of war or national emergency and at other times where
required to protect the national security [Ref. 16, p. 278].
3. Structure
The Commander Naval Reserve Force ( COMNAVRESFOR ) is
an Echelon II field command reporting directly to the Chief
of Naval Operations (CNO). Although his flag is located in
New Orleans, Louisiana, he and his staff are stationed in
Washington, D.C. The Commander Naval Reserve Force is
responsible for the following: the administration and
management of Naval Reserve programs as prescribed by the
CNO, the management of assigned resources as a major
claimant, and the direction and supervision of Naval Reserve
activities. [Ref. 17, p. 125]
In addition to COMNAVRESFOR, there are two
subordinate flag commands located in New Orleans. One is
the Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force ( COMNAVAIRRESFOR ) and
the other is the Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force
(COMNAVSURFRESFOR ) . The senior of these two commanders also
holds the title of Deputy, Commander, Naval Reserve Force.
The organizational structure of the Naval Reserve is
shown in Figure 2.1. The dashed line in the figure shows
the relationship of the Commander, Naval Reserve Force with
the two fleet Commanders. COMNAVRESFOR reports on an
additional duty basis to both CINCLANTFLT and CINCPACFLT.
[Ref. 17, p. 125]
C. TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT
As the Vietnam War was nearing an end, the United States
was trying to find a way to reduce defense expenditures
while at the same time maintain and fulfill national
security obligations. One of the methods DOD used to reduce
defense expenditures was to reduce the strength of the
active forces and increase the reliance on the Guard and
Reserve. In 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
announced the "Total Force" concept which emphasized the
joint use of active and reserve units in the development of
future national defense strategy. Secretary Laird said:
"Selected Reserves will be prepared to be the initial and
primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any
24


















































Organizational Structure of Naval Reserve
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future emergency" [Ref. 18, p. 159]. He also directed that
the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) fully
include the Total Force concept. The next Secretary of
Defense, James Schlesinger, continued the support of the
Total Force concept. Schlesinger stated: "Total force is
no longer a 'concept,' it is now the total force policy"
[Ref. 18, p. 160]. Since this statement was made in 1973,
each succeeding administration has committed themselves to
the Total Force policy. [Ref. 18, pp. 159-161]
The Total Force policy has highlighted several facts
relating to the nation's national defense. One is that the
United States cannot conduct and sustain a significant
military operation without the support of the Reserves and
Guard. Another fact is that the restraints of future
defense budgets will necessitate an increased shift of
responsibilities to the Guard and Reserve since the Reserve
forces have proven to be more cost effective when compared
to active force alternatives. [Ref. 19, p. 47]
The military now realizes that the Total Force policy
makes good sense considering the role of the military in
modern warfare. The necessity of the military to respond to
rapidly developing crises necessitates that Reserve forces
be trained and maintained at the same combat readiness as
the active duty forces they will augment. As a result, the
Reserves must be integrated as fully as possible in
26
peacetime with the units they will augment in wartime. Any
delay in the integration will have a negative effect on the
defense capabilities of the United States. [Ref. 19, p. 47]
Since 1980, the Navy has devoted a significant amount of
time and effort to ensure that the Navy Reserve is being
incorporated into the Total Force. Most of the credit for
improving the Total Force policy of the Navy during this
decade can be given to Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman,
who is a Reservist himself. The expansion of the Navy
Reserve missions has reached a point that many of the
missions of the Navy today are 100% provided for by the
Naval Reserve. Figure 2.2 illustrates the Navy Reserve's
contributions to the total Navy structure as of September
20, 1986. [Ref. 20, p. 4] No one can predict the future
success of the Total Force Policy within the Navy, but the
projected strength of the Naval Reserve of the 1990s is
impressive. If the expansion of the Naval Reserve proceeds
as planned, the U.S. Naval Reserve of the 1990s (measured in
manpower, aircraft, and ships) will be the tenth largest
naval force in the world. [Ref. 17, p. 11] Figure 2.3 is a
projection of the Naval Reserve forces and facilities of the




Unit Types Total Navy
CONUS Based Logistic Airlift Squadrons ( VR
)
100
CONUS Based Composite (Service) Squadron (VC) 100
Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons (HAL) 100
Combat SAR Capability (HC-9) 100
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units 100
Control of Shipping Organizations 99
Cargo Handling Battalions 92
Ocean Minesweepers 86
Military Sealift Command (MSC) Military Personnel 85
Mobile Construction Battalions 68
Special Boat Forces 66




Base Operating Support Personnel 19
Tactical Carrier Air Wings (CVW) 13
Early Warning A/C (VAW) 13
Surface Combatants (Frigates/Destroyers) 13
Amphibious Warfare Ships 5
NOTE: Percentages determined by counting like type units or
personnel
.
Data as of September 30, 1986.
Figure 2 .
2
Naval Reserve Contributions to the
Total Navy Structure
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AVIATION FORCES - (50) SQUADRONS
2 Carrier Air Wings
* 4 Fighter Squadrons
* 4 Strike Fighter Squadrons
* 2 Medium Attack Squadrons
* 2 Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadrons
* 2 Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons
2 Patrol Air Wings
* 13 Patrol Squadrons
1 Helicopter Air Wing
* 2 Helicopter Combat Support Squadrons
* 5 Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadrons
* 2 Helicopter Mine Countermeasure Squadrons
1 Fleet Logistic Support Wing
* 2 Fleet Composite Squadrons
* 12 Fleet Logistics Support Squadrons






5 Fleet Replenishment Oilers
Figure 2.3
Projected Naval Reserve of the 1990s
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COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES
14 Cargo Handling Battalions
19 Mobile Constructions Battalions
2 8 Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units
2 2 Craft of Opportunity Units
4 Special Boat Units
2,500 Reinforcing and Sustaining Units
15 Fleet Hospitals
FACILITIES
165 Naval Reserve Centers
5 4 Naval Reserve Readiness Centers
16 Naval Reserve Facilities
6 Naval Air Stations
2 Naval Air Facilities
7 Naval Air Reserve Areas
8 Naval Air Reserve Centers
Figure 2.3
Projected Naval Reserve of the 1990s (cont.)
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Ill . THE STUDY, DATA BASE, AND RESULTS
A. THE STUDY
The purpose of this study is to analyze how the Naval
Reserve budget has changed during the period FYs 1970-1987.
In order to analyze the question of whether or not the
Naval Reserve has received a fair share of the active Navy
budget, the budgets of the active and reserve Navy are
examined in the following areas:
1. The Naval Reserve budget authority as a percent of
active Navy budget authority.
2. The percent change of budget authority from the
previous year
.
The data analysis of the budgets will further explain
the secondary question of the impact of the Total Force
policy on the Naval Reserve budget by presenting the budget
growth in the following areas:
1. Budget authority in current dollars each year.
2. Budget authority in constant dollars each year.
3. Cumulative percent change of budget authority in
constant dollars.
The subsidiary question of whether or not the changes in
the Naval Reserve budget have appeared to be incremental or
programmatic will be analyzed by presenting the percent
change in the Naval Reserve budget each year of the study.
31
Although this study is primarily interested in the
relationships between the Navy Reserve and active Navy
budgets, the National Defense budget is included in some
tables to provide a reference as to how the total National
Defense budget changed during the same period.
B. DATA BASE
The source of information for this study is The Budget
of the United States Government for FYs 1970-1987 [Ref 131.
The transition quarter ( TQ ) from July 1, 1976 to September
30, 1976 is excluded from the data since the TQ
appropriations were based on continuing resolutions and were
relatively small. Including these TQ appropriations into
either the FY 1976 or FY 1977 budget would inflate the data
for that particular year.
The National Defense price deflators used to convert
current year dollars into constant dollars are obtained from
the Economic Report of the President for 1987 [Ref. 21, p.
249], with the exception of FY 1987 which is estimated from
the Budget of the United States Government for FY 1988.
Budget authority figures are used for the National
Defense, active Navy, and reserve Navy budget data. Budget
authority is the amount authorized by Congress to become
available for obligation during a particular fiscal year.
The competition for scarce federal budget dollars can best
be analyzed by examining an agency's budget authority for a
32
particular year. Actual budget authority figures are used
throughout except where noted otherwise
.
1 . Active Navy
The active Navy budget data consist of an aggregate
of budget authority figures for five Navy appropriations
categories. The aggregate total consists of the following
categor ies
:
Military Personnel, Navy (MPN)
Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN)
Procurement, Navy
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy
(RDT&E)
Military Construction Navy (MCN)
In an effort to segregate the active and reserve
personnel funding, the MPN category does not include active
duty Reserve funding. The Guard and Reserve program within
the MPN category (FYs 1970-1982) is segregated out and
included in the Navy Reserve aggregate totals. Actual
budget authority is used for the Reserve Personnel program
except for FYs 1981 and 1982 which are budget authority
estimates. Estimates are used for FYs 1981 and 1982 since
actual budget authority was not available. Beginning in FY
1983, all personnel funding for the Naval Reserve was
included in the Naval Reserve personnel account.
The O&MN category does not include Navy Reserve O&M
funding. The Guard and Reserve program within the O&MN
category (FYs 1970-1972) is segregated out and included in
the Navy Reserve budget totals. Beginning in FY 1973, the
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Navy Reserve established their own Operation and Maintenance
appr opr iat ion
.
The procurement category included the following
accounts
:
Aircraft Procurement, Navy ( APN
)
Weapons Procurement, Navy (WPN)
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy ( SCN
)
Other Procurement, Navy ( OPN ) .
The following appropriations categories are not




Navy Management and Trust Funds
These categories are not included since they are a
small portion of the active Navy budget. For example, in FY
1986, the four categories which were excluded from the study
accounted for approximately 2% of the total active Navy
budget
.
2 . Navy Reserve
The Navy Reserve budget data consist of an aggregate
of budget authority figures for all four Naval Reserve
appropriations categories. The aggregate amounts consist of
the following categories:
Reserve Personnel, Navy (RPN)
Operation and Maintenance, Navy Reserve (O&MNR)
Military Construction, Naval Reserve (MCNR)
Procurement - National Guard and Reserve Equipment
The Procurement category is included in an attempt
to reflect the recent attitude of Congress toward the Guard
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and Reserve programs. Fiscal year 1984 was the first year
Congress set aside a separate account for National Guard and
Reserve Equipment. Congress wanted this account "for
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked
combat vehicles, torpedoes, other weapons, and other
procurement for the reserve components of the Armed Forces"
[Ref. 20J. Beginning with the FY 1984 budget submission,
the Naval Reserve procurement budget authority has been




The National Defense budget authority data includes
not only the DOD but also the atomic energy defense
activities and defense related activities. The National
Defense data is included to illustrate how the active and
reserve Navy budgets compare to the total budget authority
available for all agencies under the federal budget category
of National Defense.
4 Summary
Although the format and accounting procedures have
changed somewhat during the period of this study, every
attempt was made to segregate the active and reserve Navy
budget authority where possible to ensure that the data
reflects the true relationship of the reserve and active
Navy budgets. Current dollar amounts were adjusted to
constant 1982 dollars using the National Defense Price
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Deflators. Current dollar budget data appear in Appendix A
and constant dollar budget data appear in Appendix B. All




1 . Budget Authority in Current Dollars
Table 1 shows how the total budget authority in
current dollars increased during the period of the study.
The budgets of the National Defense, active Navy, and Navy
Reserve increased by the following amounts:
Dollars Percent
National Defense $76,689 - 292,929 282%
Active Navy $19,010 - 83,074 337%
Navy Reserve $355 - 2,387 572%
Although the growth rate of the Navy Reserve looks
large and impressive, the growth does not tell the full
story since inflation is not taken out of the budget
f igures
.
Figure 3.1 represents graphically the relationships
of the active and reserve Navy budgets in current dollars.
Since the dollar amounts for the Naval Reserve are small
compared to the active Navy, the dollar scale is changed for
the Navy Reserve to allow more detail to be shown.
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Total Budget Authority in Current Dollars
2 . Budget Authority in Constant Dollars
The budget figures in Table 2 are much more
revealing than the figures in Table 1 since they represent
the total budget authority converted to constant 1982
dollars. The constant 1982 dollars are obtained by dividing
the current dollar figures by National Defense Deflators,
then multiplying the quotient by 100.
The constant dollar figures in Table 2 show that
during the period of the study, the budgets increased by the
following amounts:
Dollars Percent
$208,394 to 251,872 21%
$51,685 to 71,431 38%
$965 to 2,052 113%
These growth results reveal that, on a percentage
basis, the Navy Reserve budget increased almost three times
as much as the active Navy budget during the period.
Observing the figures in Table 2, strictly on the
basis of whether or not there is an increase or decrease in
the budget totals each year, shows an increase in the budget
as follows:
Years Percent
National Defense 8 o£ 18 44.4%
Active Navy 10 of 18 55.5%





Figure 3.2 is a graphical representation of
relationships of the total budget growth of the active and
reserve Navy budget in constant dollars.
An additional analysis of the budgetary growth of
the three budgets is depicted in Table 3, which shows the
growth of the three budgets on a yearly percentage basis
using FY 1970 as the base year. The Navy Reserve enjoyed a
positive increase of budget authority for each year of the
study. By contrast, the budget authority of both the
National Defense and active Navy is primarily negative
during the post-Vietnam War 1970s.
Figure 3.3 a graphical presentation of growth of the
active and Reserve Navy budgets using the base year of 1970.
3. Percent Change from Previous Year
The figures in Table 4 present the percent increase
or decrease from the previous year's budget during the
period FYs 1970-1987. Although the budget changes of both
the active and reserve Navy varied greatly during the
period, five Important facts can be obtained from the data:
(1) There were six years (FYs 76, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83)
when the Navy Reserve budget increased less or
decreased more on a percentage basis than the active
Navy budget. Therefore, during the remaining twelve
years, the Navy Reserve budget was increased more or
cut less (as a percentage) than the active Navy
40
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PERCENT CHANGE 21% 38% 113%
* National Defense Deflators were obtained from the Economic
Report of the President for 1987 , except for FY87 which
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Figure 3.2




PERCENT GROWTH FYs 1970 - 1987
CONSTANT 1982 DOLLARS
NATIONAL ACTIVE NAVAL
FY DEFENSE NAVY RESERVE
70 BASE YEAR BASE YEAR BASE YEAR
71 -9 . 31% -8 .15% .73%
72 -7.80 -2.03 18.03
73 -12.30 -2.02 29. 43
74 -15. 32 -9 .32 25.70
75 -20.66 -14.12 24.87
76 -16.00 -9.05 24.97
77 -16.42 -6.80 19.27
78 -16.54 1.28 19 . 38
79 -17.34 -1.53 20.41
80 -16.13 -1.01 17.31
81 -5.78 8.22 30.05
82 4.95 19.03 30.16
83 13.87 35. 44 34.82
84 18.80 30.55 43.73
85 28.54 47.44 91.81
86 25.11 43.60 110.67
87(Est





















































Budget Authority Percent Growth Constant 1982 Dollars
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budget. Example: In FY 83 the active Navy budget increased
by 13.78%, but the Navy Reserve budget only increased by
3.58%.
(2) There were three years (FYs 72, 81, 85) when the Navy
Reserve budget changed by more than 10 percent.
(3) There were three years (FYs 70, 74, 75) when the Navy
Reserve budget decreased, but the active Navy budget
decreased by a greater percentage. Example: In FY
74 the Navy Reserve was cut by 2.88%, but the active
Navy was cut by 7.45%.
(4) The nine years (FYs 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 79, 84, 86,
87) in which the active Navy budget decreased, the
Navy Reserve budget did not receive as large a
decrease in their budget.
(5) The nine years (FYs 72, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83,
85) in which there was an increase in the active Navy
budget, the Navy Reserve budget received a larger
increase in only three of those years (FYs 72, 81,
85) .
Figure 3.4 is a graphical representation of the
percent change figures for the active and reserve budgets in
Table 4.
4 . Navy Reserve Budget Authority as a Percentage of the
Active Navy Budget
The figures in Table 5 represent the Navy Reserve
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Figure 3.4
Budget Authority Percent Change from Previous Fiscal Year
47
authority in constant 1982 dollars during the period FYs
1970-1987. These figures are perhaps the most pertinent
ones to this study. The percentages reveal that, during six
years (FYs 76, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83), the Navy Reserve failed
to maintain or increase their percentage share of the active
Navy budget. It should be noted that these are the same
fiscal years discussed in Table 4 when the Navy Reserve
budget did not receive the same percentage increase as the
active Navy budget. During the remaining twelve years of
the study, the Navy Reserve budget as a percentage of the
active Navy budget displayed an upward trend when compared
to the previous year's budget.
Although the majority of the years revealed an
upward trend, the Navy Reserve budget as a percentage of the
active Navy budget only increased from 1.87% in FY 70 to
2.87% in FY 87, or a 1% increase in eighteen years. Figure
3.5 is a graphical display of the figures in Table 5.
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TABLE 5
NAVY RESERVE BUDGET AUTHORITY
AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE ACTIVE NAVY BUDGET AUTHORITY

















































































Figure 3 . 5
Navy Reserve Budget Authority as a Percentage




The primary question to be answered in this thesis is
whether or not the Naval Reserve has received their fair
share of the active Navy budget during FYs 70-87. The
budgetary data presented in Table 5 indicate that the Naval
Reserve has received its fair share of the active Navy
budget during the majority of the eighteen years of this
study. During these years the Naval Reserve budget, as a
percentage of the active Navy budget, has displayed an
upward trend when compared to the previous year's budget for
twelve of those years (FYs 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 79, 81,
84, 85, 86, 87). These same twelve years correspond to the
twelve years in Table 4 where the Navy Reserve budget was
increased more or cut less (as a percentage) than the active
Navy budget .
Although the Naval Reserve has done well competing for
funds with the active Navy, it appears that their success in
competing for these funds is justified. The personnel
growth alone is justification enough for budgetary growth in
the Naval Reserve. Appendix C is a display of personnel
end-strengths for the active and reserve Navy. During the
period FYs 70-87, the Naval Reserve personnel strength has
grown by 12.7% as compared to a 21.9% decrease in active
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Navy personnel strength. Of particular interest is the
period FYs 80-87 when the personnel strength of the Naval
Reserve increased by 70.1%, as compared to an 11.4% increase
in active Navy personnel strength. This tremendous growth
of Naval Reserve personnel, coupled with the increased
missions of the Naval Reserve, makes a good case for an even
larger budget share for the Naval Reserve.
The overall growth of the reserve forces in DOD promoted
the Reserve Forces Policy Board in their FY 86 annual report
to the President and Congress to state:
The share of the Department of Defense budget
allocated to the reserve components has not kept pace with
the growth in personnel strength and increased missions
assigned to the National Guard and Reserve in recent
years .
Budget restraints, among other reasons, may force
decisions to place additional reliance on the reserve
components. The Board urges caution regarding the
application of budget cuts equal in percentage to the
active components when, in fact, the Guard and Reserve
have been given greater mission responsibilities. The
reserve components will be able to accomplish presently
assigned missions provided they are supported with
adequate funding to recruit, retain, equip, and train
personnel. [Ref. 20, p. xviii]
B. TOTAL FORCE
The second question be to answered by this study is
whether or not the Naval Reserve budget has been impacted by
the Total Force concept. Since the genesis of the Total
Force concept began in FY 70, the Naval Reserve budget
growth during the period of this study (FYs 70-87) will
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reflect the impact of the Total Force policy on the Naval
Reserve budget .
The data in Table 2 describes the growth of the Naval
Reserve budget authority in constant dollars. The 1970s can
be described as a time of fluctuating changes in the Naval
Reserve budget with periods of increase, decrease, and
relative constant budget growth. The Naval Reserve budget
appears to have gone through a fluctuating pattern similar
to that of the active Navy during the post-Vietnam war wind-
down of the 1970s. It was not until FY 81 that the Naval
Reserve budget began a positive growth period for seven
consecutive years (FYs 81-87).
The result is that the Total Force concept does not
appear to have had a positive effect on the Naval Reserve
budget until FY 81. The large, positive increase in the
Navy Reserve budget coincides with the National Defense
budget growth initiated by the Reagan administration.
Although the Reagan administration overall defense buildup
appears to be the overriding factor for the growth of the
Naval Reserve budget in the 1980s, the Total Force concept
must be having a positive effect since the Naval Reserve has
enjoyed a positive growth during FYs 86-87 when the active
Navy budget was decreasing. Also, there are few that would
dispute the belief that John Lehman, who is a reservist
himself and Secretary of the Navy from FYs 80-87, had a
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positive impact on the budgetary growth of the Naval Reserve
in the 1980s.
C. INCREMENTAL OR PROGRAMMATIC
The subsidiary question to be answered in this study is
whether or not the changes in the Naval Reserve budget have
appeared to be incremental or programmatic. Using the same
criteria in the Fenno study [Ref. 3], the Naval Reserve
budget changes would be considered Incremental if the
majority of them are 10% or less per year. The data in
Table 4, which describe the budget authority percent change
from the previous year, indicate that the changes in the
Naval Reserve budget are primarily incremental since fifteen
out of eighteen budget years had a change of 10% or less.
The fact that the changes in the Naval Reserve budget
are primarily incremental is important because it
establishes the Naval Reserve as a federal agency with an
established budgetary base. The presence of this strong
budgetary base would allow the Naval Reserve to focus their
attention on future programs without being overly concerned
that the funding level of existing programs will undergo
massive changes from Congress.
D. SUMMARY
Although the Naval Reserve does not have all the
facilities, personnel, and new equipment it would like in
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order to accomplish its missions, the Naval Reserve of the
1980s has enjoyed tremendous growth in both their personnel
strength and their budget. Former Secretary of the Navy
John Lehman's remarks given to a group of reservists in 1982
sums up the optimism for future growth of the Naval Reserve
program:
We in the Reserves have found year after year that
talk is cheap. Always we find high hopes and rhetoric
that we're going to modernize the Reserves, give them new
equipment and new aircraft, new ships . . . but nothing
ever happens. However, in the last 14 months, we have put
forward a real program . . . These are real programs, not
rhetorical ones. [Ref. 22, p. 72]
Future analysis of the Naval Reserve budget will verify
if the recent growth trends of the 1980s will be long term.
Only time will tell how well the Naval Reserve will continue





ACTIVE NAVY BUDGET DATA




FY MPN O&M PROC RDT&E MILCON TOTAL
70 4,745 5,133 6,606 2,236 300 19,020
71 4,595 4,840 6,979 2,178 302 18,894
72 4,887 5,054 8,502 2,368 355 21,166
73 5,284 5,315 8,703 3,120 518 22,941
74 5,414 6,594 8,416 2,681 609 23,715
75 5,654 7,297 8,096 3,024 606 24,678
76 5,716 8,300 9,832 3,257 770 27,875
77 5,946 9,690 10,608 3,723 570 30,537
78 6,230 11,066 13,704 4,018 472 35,489
79 6,567 11,936 14,021 4,480 760 37,763
80 7,125 14,821 15,566 4,572 585 42,670
56
FY MPN O&M PROC RDT&E MILCON TOTAL
81 8,661* 17,743 19,770 4,997 794 51,964
82 10,053* 19,728 24,462 5,828 1,451 61,523
83 10,847 21,071 33,429 6,094 1,081 72,521
84 11,446 22,266 29,738 7,586 1,232 72,267
85 15,701 25,163 32,228 9,197 1,535 83,824
86 15,875 23,319 31,920 9,572 1,622 82,308
87* 17,550 23,303 31,488 9,353 1,379 83,074
* Estimates
Notes: 1. Categories within total budget may not add to
the exact total due to to rounding errors.
2. MP - Military Personnel
O&M - Operations and Maintenance
PROC - Procurement
RDT&E - Research Development Test and
Evaluation
MILCON - Military Construction
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APPENDIX B
NAVAL RESERVE BUDGET DATA




































FY MP O&M RESEQP MILCON TOTAL
84 767 637 51 31 1,485
85 1,127 829 20 61 2,036
86 1, 264 851 100 40 2,255
87* 1, 395 887 61 45 2,387
*Estmates
Notes: 1. Categories within the total budget may not add to
exact total due to rounding errors.
2 . MP - Military Personnel
O&M - Operations and Maintenance
RESEQP - Reserve Equipment


























Source: Budget of the United States for FYs 1970 - 1987
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